Cambridge Forecast Group Blog

The Center for Contemporary Conflict is pleased to announce our August 2007 issue of Strategic Insights

Monday, August 20, 2007

Strategic Insights

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si

This month’s special edition focuses on WMD proliferation, and it includes a series of feature articles on “Terrorism, Transnational Networks, and WMD Proliferation: Indications and Warning in an Era of Globalization;” conference reports from two recently held WMD-related events; and three student theses exploring WMD-related topics.

The feature articles presented are: “South Africa from the Perspective of WMD Supply Networks: Indications and Warning Implications <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/burgessAug07.asp> ,” by Stephen F. Burgess; “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/coleAug07.asp> ,” by Leonard A. Cole; “Attractiveness of WMD for Radical Islamist Movements: Ideological Constraints, Black-Spots, and Failed-Weak States <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/plebaniAug07.asp> ,” by Andrea Plebani; “The Biological Weapons Proliferation Threat: Past, Present, and Future Assessments and Responses <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/rhodesAug07.asp> ,” by Catherine Rhodes and Malcolm Dando; “The London Ricin Cell <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/segellAug07.asp> ,” by Glen Segell; “Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports-Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/tertraisAug07.asp> ,” by Bruno Tertrais; “Terrorism, Organized Crime, and WMD Smuggling: Challenge and Response <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/williamsAug07.asp> ,” by Phil Williams; and “Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Nuclear Trafficking <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/zaitsevaAug07.asp> ,” by Lyudmila Zaitseva.

Our new conference reports on recent WMD-related events include “Over-the-Horizon Threats: WMD Proliferation 2020 <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/lavoyAug07.asp> ,” held in Paris on June 28–29, 2007; and “Over-the-Horizon Proliferation: Challenges for Interdiction and Counter-Proliferation Policy <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/russellAug07.asp> ,” held in Monterey on June 18–20, 2007. The recent student theses on WMD-related topics presented this month are: “Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material in the Homeland <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/eack07.pdf> ,” by Kevin D. Eack; “Mobile Sensor Networks: A Discrete Event Simulation of WMD Threat Detection in Urban Traffic Schemes <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/hyink07.pdf> ,” by Jeffrey F. Hyink; and “The Constraining Dynamics of Public Opinion <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/wyckoff06.pdf> ,” by Christopher A. Wyckoff.

New Viewpoint articles presented this month include: “Understanding Iran’s Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/carrAug07.asp> ,” by Ryan Carr; “Project 2008: Notes on the Russian Succession <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/blankAug07.asp> ,” by Stephen Blank; and “A Proof-of-Concept Model for Evaluating Insurgency Management Policies Using the System Dynamics Methodology <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/andersonAug07.asp> ,” by Edward G. Anderson Jr.

We also present three new faculty listings in the Department of National Security Affairs: Homeland Security and Defense <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/facHLSAug07.html> ; Latin American Studies <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/facLAAug07.html> ; Middle East Studies <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/facMEAug07.html>
——————————————————————————–
FEATURE ARTICLES: TERRORISM, TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS, AND WMD PROLIFERATION: INDICATIONS AND WARNING IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

In “South Africa from the Perspective of WMD Supply Networks: Indications and Warning Implications <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/burgessAug07.asp> ,” Stephen F. Burgess observes that South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons program in 1991, chemical and biological warfare program in 1993, and missile program in 1994—becoming a “disarmament trendsetter” in bringing to signature an “African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone” in 1995, and compromise in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2005. But despite its continuing commitment to WMD nonproliferation and arms export controls, Burgess finds several issues related to WMD proliferation remain. Burgess examines proliferation problems and transnational networks that are tied to South Africa’s history as a developer of WMD during the Apartheid era, and concludes the existence of proliferation networks in South Africa alongside terrorist networks are a cause for concern, as the possibility exists that WMD and related materials could be offered for sale in South Africa to al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks with a presence in South Africa—and that the prospects for states like Iran acquiring WMD devices and materials are greater, as is the possibility that those types of states will pass on WMD to terrorist organizations.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/burgessAug07.asp

In “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/coleAug07.asp> ,” Leonard A. Cole points out that despite the broad condemnation of biological and chemical weapons, some nations and sub-national groups are still seeking to acquire them. One helpful step, he believes, would be to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) by adding provisions for verification of compliance that would include visits by international inspectors to a country’s laboratories and other relevant facilities, and would subject violators of the treaty to punishment, including sanctions and force. And while sub-state groups are not directly affected by the terms of the BWC, Cole believes that strengthening the norm against biological weapons could influence behavior even among terrorist groups. Nonetheless, the threat, even if lessened, will not be eliminated, so the need for preparedness, and the ability to respond to a bioattack, will exist as long as the threat persists.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/coleAug07.asp

In “Attractiveness of WMD for Radical Islamist Movements: Ideological Constraints, Black-Spots, and Failed-Weak States <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/plebaniAug07.asp> ,” Andrea Plebani writes how, several years after the 9/11 attacks, radical Islamist organizations remain the major threat facing the international security system, and though operations conducted by the U.S. and its allies on the economic, political and operative level managed to inflict serious damage on these organizations, we still face a highly adaptive enemy that has, on several occasions, shown it’s capable of acting on a global scale with exceptional effectiveness. The symbolic importance of the targets chosen confirm the enemy has extensive knowledge of the western system and its vulnerabilities, aiming to paralyze the entire western system by terror. Relying only on the use of force against this foe means ignoring the pivotal role played by radical Islamist ideology, which is acquiring an increasing weight inside the Islamic community and helps such movements to survive the serious blows inflicted on them. The WMD-radical Islamist organization combination represents an extremely serious and complicated threat, and to combat it, it is essential that intelligence activity be stepped up to prevent terrorists from finding safe havens; that cooperation be enhanced with states considered at risk; and that regional initiatives be developed aimed at improving the system of controlling the import/export of sensitive materials and instruments so as to limit the risk of WMD smuggling.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/plebaniAug07.asp

In “The Biological Weapons Proliferation Threat: Past, Present, and Future Assessments and Responses <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/rhodesAug07.asp> ,” Catherine Rhodes and Malcolm Dando examine the historical use of biological weapons, noting that when the scientific analysis of infectious diseases began to be clarified in the 19th century, states began to seriously consider this new knowledge for hostile purposes. Large-scale state offensive biological weapons programs in the 20th century have progressively utilized the growing understanding of microbiology: bacteriology in the First World War; aerobiology in the Second World War; industrial production and virology in the early Cold War; and, genetic engineering in the late Cold War. The authors find the response to this looming threat has been “grossly inadequate,” and even with the inclusion of “bacteriological methods of warfare” to the prohibition of use of chemical warfare in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, this agreement had many weaknesses. And the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is widely considered the weakest of the international treaties dealing with WMD. Nonetheless, the authors believe there is much potential within existing international regulations to provide a firm foundation for the web of prevention against misuse of biotechnology, but that improving the coherence of existing regulations as a set is an important step to realize this potential.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/rhodesAug07.asp

In “The London Ricin Cell <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/segellAug07.asp> ,” Glen Segell observes that not only do WMD proliferation networks exist, but that the London Ricin cell was one such network. Segell argues that the best means of preventing a WMD proliferation network from emerging through the coalescence of terrorism, warlordism and organized crime is to tackle the issue of weak and failed states. Segell finds that terrorism, warlordism and organized crime can exhibit many similar characteristics, and that there are instances where they form an ad hoc “Deadly Trinity” that could foster global WMD proliferation networks. A global WMD proliferation network could originate in a weak/failed state and continue in a strong Western democracy. The evolutionary nature of proliferation and counter-proliferation may necessitate preemptive military action against a rogue state or rogue non-state actors: combined, these efforts will result not only in tackling WMD proliferation networks, but also in handling warlordism, narco-trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime, thus promoting stability and democracy.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/segellAug07.asp

In “Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports-Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/tertraisAug07.asp> ,” Bruno Tertrais examines the import strategy utilized by Pakistani officials to build their indigenous nuclear program, and Pakistan’s subsequent export activities operated by A.Q. Khan. Tertrais argues that Pakistan’s successful import and export programs should serve as a warning of the ability of procurement networks to mount effective deception efforts, and to operate in the seams of inadequate export control systems. By looking at the beginnings of the Pakistani nuclear program in the 1970s, and the transformation of the network in 1980s, its comparison to a “Wal-Mart” by IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei appears to be an inappropriate description, as the Khan network was in fact a privatized subsidiary of a larger, state-based network originally dedicated to the Pakistani nuclear program better characterized as an “imports-exports enterprise.” The “next A.Q. Khan,” if there is one, will not be an isolated individual but somebody with access and experience drawn from a country’s national nuclear program.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/tertraisAug07.asp

In “Terrorism, Organized Crime, and WMD Smuggling: Challenge and Response <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/williamsAug07.asp> ,” Phil Williams observes the WMD proliferation threat, the threat posed by global jihadists and the threat from transnational organized crime overlap and intersect in important ways, and argues that the “nightmare scenario” is that these intersections will result in a WMD being brought into the United States to inflict large-scale casualties that would dwarf those of 9/11. He examines the possible smuggling of an improvised nuclear device (IND) into the United States, finding both good news and bad news. The bad news is that the smugglers have the advantage as the capacity to embed illegal or dangerous cargo in legitimate shipments presents major problems of detection, and consequently smugglers are successful most of the time. The good news is that significant initiatives have been taken to secure commerce against terrorist exploitation, and terrorist organizations, as yet, have developed only limited skills in smuggling. Williams cautions that the “bad news about the good news” is that it will not last, and as terrorist groups engage in more and more criminal activities such as counterfeiting, smuggling of a variety of illegal products, document fraud, and credit-card fraud, their level of skill and sophistication will likely rise. Williams believes the bad news outweighs the good news, though efforts beyond those measures already taken could help to level the playing field.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/williamsAug07.asp

And finally, in “Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Nuclear Trafficking <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/zaitsevaAug07.asp> ,” Lyudmila Zaitseva describes the merging of international terrorist organizations with transnational organized crime, as one of the most serious threats we face today. She notes there are clear overlaps between international terrorist and organized crime networks in Latin America and Asia where weapons smuggling, kidnappings, and financial crime have been widely used to raise proceeds for terror activities. Zaitseva focuses on the interest displayed by organized crime, drug trafficking networks, and terrorist groups in acquiring, smuggling, selling, buying and using nuclear and other radioactive materials. The open source information collected in the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) operated by the University of Salzburg suggests a possible nexus between organized criminal networks and terrorist groups seeking nuclear fissile material and radioactive substances. The involvement of organized criminal groups, albeit relatively small and unsophisticated, in nuclear smuggling activities has been established based on the study of some 400 nuclear trafficking incidents recorded in the DSTO database between January 2001 and December 2005. While elements of organized crime could be identified in about 10 percent of these incidents, no reliable evidence of the “marriages of convenience” between all three—organized crime, terrorists, and nuclear trafficking—could be found.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/zaitsevaAug07.asp

——————————————————————————–
CONFERENCE REPORTS

In this month’s edition of Strategic Insights, we present two new reports from recent WMD-related conferences:

In “Over-the-Horizon Threats: WMD Proliferation 2020 <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/lavoyAug07.asp> ,” Peter R. Lavoy and Robin Walker report on the June 28–29, 2007 event in Paris organized by the Center for Contemporary Conflict and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/lavoyAug07.asp

In “Over-the-Horizon Proliferation: Challenges for Interdiction and Counter-Proliferation Policy <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/russellAug07.asp> ,” James A. Russell and Trisha Bury report on the June 18-20, 2007 event in Monterey sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/russellAug07.asp

——————————————————————————–
STUDENT THESES

We present three new theses relating to WMD in this month’s edition:

In “Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material in the Homeland <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/eack07.pdf> ,” Kevin D. Eack observes it’s well established among the intelligence community that terrorists view the acquisition of nuclear or radiological materials (NRAM) as a goal in furtherance of their efforts to attack the U.S. within its borders. The use of NRAM in a nuclear weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or a radiological dispersion device (RDD) could potentially kill and injure thousands of American citizens, and such a terrorist act on U.S. soil could cause profound economic damage, and would terrify the nation. While international efforts have been underway for many years to better secure military nuclear weapons and materials, Eack finds that a comprehensive national security strategy in the U.S. for commercial nuclear materials is needed. While some strides were made in 2005 through measures taken by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to better secure nuclear generating power facilities, there is no similar comprehensive security strategy for NRAM stored or being transported in the U.S. This poses a potentially serious threat to our homeland security. Eack reviews the present statutory and regulatory scheme for NRAM, and outlines a new approach to better ensure our homeland security.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/eack07.pdf

In “Mobile Sensor Networks: A Discrete Event Simulation of WMD Threat Detection in Urban Traffic Schemes <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/hyink07.pdf> ,” Jeffrey F. Hyink explains that the increased threat of WMD attack in America necessitates new and innovative approaches to homeland security. Accordingly, he proposes a layered security model in which an attacker must successfully penetrate multiple defensive constructs in order to complete an attack. As part of a layered defensive approach, a network of sensor equipped vehicles operating in urban traffic is considered. To-date, sensor packages have been developed for vehicles without detailed, area-specific analysis of their aggregate performance measures. The possible effectiveness of this network of sensors in detecting vehicle based WMD attacks is explored: a Discrete Event Simulation using actual roadmap data was developed and analyzed encompassing the greater Washington D. C. area, and deployment in random search patterns yielded an appreciable deterrent of greater than 10 percent probability of detection only when more than 200 patrolling agents are assigned. More optimized employment schemes, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures are discussed, in addition to other detection statistics and summary results.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/hyink07.pdf

In “The Constraining Dynamics of Public Opinion <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/wyckoff06.pdf> ,” Christopher A. Wyckoff recalls the since the start of the Cold War, the influence of public opinion on presidential decision-making has been debated. How and when public opinion constrains policymakers and their options is essential to understanding why certain policy decisions for the use of force are made, and what decisions can be predicted in the future. Comparing U.S. policies implemented in response to terrorist attacks against US sovereignty and Iraq’s persistent pursuit of WMD by presidents from two different political parties presents opportunity to analyze how public opinion is viewed by presidents, what actions the administrations took to influence public opinion, and whether public opinion ultimately affected the foreign policy decision-making of the executive.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/wyckoff06.pdf

——————————————————————————–
VIEWPOINTS

In “Understanding Iran’s Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/carrAug07.asp> ,” Ryan Carr explains that Iran supports the Iraqi insurgency mainly to help bolster its own security, and has supported both Sunni and Shiite factions as a result. As such, Iran is not looking to take on the U.S. militarily, but it is willing to bear some costs—including the possibility that the United States might take some direct action against it—to counter-balance America’s influence in the region. The United States, as it did in Vietnam, has worked to build consensus for the war by framing it as a struggle between good and evil, which fuels the perception of the insurgency as ideological, aggressive, and fundamentally committed. And while these motivations may certainly be true of many Iraqi insurgents, Carr notes they do not reflect Iran’s motivations—but by conflating the two the United States has absolved itself from having played any part in provoking a balancing response from Iran. The United States must thus develop more self-awareness, and better appreciate how its actions provoke reactions. This does not mean having to accept Iran’s support of the insurgency, or ignore their attempts to develop nuclear weapons, but it does mean better appreciating that geopolitical considerations are principally driving these events, and not let emotions get the best of us.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/carrAug07.asp

In “Project 2008: Notes on the Russian Succession <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/blankAug07.asp> ,” Stephen Blank observes that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be leaving office in 2008, and that Russia is thus undergoing a succession scenario, whose course and outcome will have profound repercussions for foreign policy and for Russia’s further institutional development. So far, a comprehensive strategy of internal consolidation that entails portraying Russia being a besieged fortress threatened by enemies from within and without, and a shift toward an ever greater scope of a police state, is taking shape. A look at these fault lines reveal what Blank describes as the growing pathology of the regime’s politics, even as it advances economically and fiscally. He cautions that the regime’s economic gains are largely a creation of that same pathological state, and that the scale of corruption, violence, and misrule has its own logic as well as its own timetable, which we cannot know in advance. Blank observes that as this system reproduces the paradigm of past Russian experiments in state-building, we can predict the destination with reasonable accuracy, especially as Russia has tragically been there before.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/blankAug07.asp

In “A Proof-of-Concept Model for Evaluating Insurgency Management Policies Using the System Dynamics Methodology <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/andersonAug07.asp> ,” Edward G. Anderson Jr. demonstrates the potential of using the system dynamics computer simulation methodology to gain insight into the dynamic behavior of insurgencies. A basic model of insurgencies containing the dynamic mechanisms of incident suppression, insurgent creation, and war weariness is developed, which, if properly adapted, can explain much of the behavior of insurgencies. By examining the Anglo-Irish War of 1916-21, Anderson applies his model to determine which system parameters might have most affected its outcome, and finds the lack of British governmental legitimacy in Ireland may have hindered the simulated efficacy of insurgency suppression efforts. He also finds that the good works policy might have aided insurgency-suppression in Ireland by separating insurgents from their supporting population. Anderson proposes that such a model, and the system dynamics methodology in general, could be developed to assist policymakers manage current insurgencies throughout the world.

LINK: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/andersonAug07.asp

——————————————————————————–
FACULTY POSITIONS

The Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School currently has open faculty positions in Homeland Security and Defense <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/facHLSAug07.html> ; Latin American Studies <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/facLAAug07.html> ; and Middle East Studies <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/facMEAug07.html> . NSA Department faculty will be at APSA in Chicago; please let us know if you would like to schedule a brief informational interview there. Positions close on October 1st.

LINK: http://www.nps.edu/

academics/sigs/nsa/news/jobopenings/index.html

——————————————————————————–
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

HOME DELIVERY
When we publish a new issue, we email you an e-newsletter with links to each article. There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other purpose.

FEEDBACK
We welcome comments on individual articles or on the journal as a whole. E-mail comments to ccc@nps.edu mailto:ccc@nps.edu.

Mr. Robin Walker
Research Associate, Center for Contemporary Conflict
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
(831) 656-7891
Fax: (831) 656-2949
rjwalker@nps.edu

The Center for Contemporary Conflict

is pleased to announce our August 2007 issue of Strategic Insights

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si

Robin Walker rjwalker@nps.edu

Monday, August 20, 2007

The Center for Contemporary Conflict is pleased to announce our August 2007 issue of Strategic Insights